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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FROM THE TECHNICAL TO THE PERSONAL:
TEACHING AND LEARNING HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATION
AND REFORM

ALLISON K. HOFFMAN*, WHITNEY A. BROWN** &
LINDSAY CUTLER ***
INTRODUCTION
In the Fall of 2016, I taught Health Law and Policy for the fourth
consecutive semester. In this repeat loop, one thing has become increasingly
clear: the aspect of this survey course that I work with most closely as a
scholar—the regulation of health care financing and insurance, including the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 1 (ACA)—is also the material that I
find the most challenging to teach. Every time I reflect on teaching this
material, and hear from students about how they learn this material, the thing
that stands out is how critical it is that my students understand the profound
impact that this technical subject has on individuals’ lives.
As my touchstone in teaching health insurance regulation and reform, I
strive to connect with the human impact of this convoluted field of regulation.
When I teach state and federal insurance regulations and ACA policies, I delve

* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. Thank you to students like Lindsay and Whitney, who
make teaching a pleasure and an opportunity for me to continue to grow and learn. I dedicate this
Article to my health law and policy instructor and mentor, Ted Marmor, whose invitation to work
as his Teaching Assistant provided my first steps into teaching.
** J.D. Candidate 2017, UCLA School of Law. A class—even one as inherently interesting as
Health Law and Policy—is only as good as the professor who teaches it. I feel so lucky that mine
was Professor Hoffman. I am grateful for her mentorship and to have witnessed (and been the
beneficiary of) her matchless ability to instill her passion for the discipline in her students.
Thanks also to Lindsay for many thought-provoking discussions in class, in preparing this
Article, and beyond.
*** J.D. Candidate 2017, UCLA School of Law, David J. Epstein Program in Public Interest Law
and Policy. I am so grateful to have taken Health Law and Policy with Professor Hoffman at
UCLA Law, and for the invaluable experience of co-authoring this Article. It is rare to have the
opportunity to reflect on and think through the experience of learning with both a classmate and a
professor, and I am extremely thankful to them both.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124
Stat. 1029. Subsequent references in this Article to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act refer to the Act, as amended.
411

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2989418

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

412

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:411

into the technical, and then zoom out to consider how these technical details
affect individuals and their security and well-being and, in turn, what this
impact suggests about our social values.
Health insurance regulation simultaneously shapes and is an expression of
social values. 2 It defines the types of harms we expect individuals to shoulder
on their own and what we are willing to mitigate collectively, as a society.
Every rule that expands the scope of insurance—whether private or social
insurance—is a signal of greater social solidarity with respect to each other’s
health. Every contraction of the scope of insurance is the opposite, and leaves
individuals more vulnerable to poor health or financial insecurity due to high
health care spending. These broader implications are what draw me to the
topic—as a teacher and as a scholar. My ultimate goal is for my students to
understand this social meaning: why insurance is regulated as it is, how that
regulation reflects larger social values, and the impact—both intended and
unintended—that insurance regulation has on the shape of our society.
Teaching health insurance regulation is objectively challenging, more so
than most other subjects I teach, as I discuss below. In addition, I find it
personally challenging to teach it because I am deeply immersed in its
intricacies. Depth of knowledge in a field is undoubtedly valuable for a
professor. I often draw on my practice experience as a health law associate
when I teach. I can still remember the fear of negotiating a HIPAA 3 business
associate agreement for the first time, or flipping furiously through Stark Law 4
regulations at midnight, while eating potato chips and chocolate from the Lindt
store in the lobby of the Boston office of Ropes & Gray, where I worked.
When I teach HIPAA or the Stark Law, I can still remember learning them
myself. But after working on health insurance regulation and reform for nearly
a decade as a scholar, I find it harder to identify which aspects of this topic are
obvious and which are challenging and counterintuitive. Simply put, too much
of it makes sense to me. I am reminded of this fact each time I teach. As I map
out the many ways we pay for health care in the United States—group versus
individual plans, self-insured versus fully-insured employer plans, public
versus private insurance—and how each category is subject to different rules

2. See Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models of Health Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1873 (2011); Allison K.
Hoffman, Reimagining the Risk of Long-Term Care, 16 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 239
(2016). We use health care “financing” and “insurance” interchangeably throughout this Article
to refer to the various types of private insurance and public insurance that pay for health care.
3. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936.
4. The Ethics in Patient Referrals Act of 1989 is called the “Stark Law” in honor of its
sponsor, Representative Fortney “Pete” Stark. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012); 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.350–
411.389 (2015).
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and regulatory bodies, students look at me with puzzlement. Their looks
remind me that these distinctions are illogical.
When asked to write this Article on teaching health insurance regulation
and reform, I figured I should confirm that what I thought worked in the
classroom was actually working. To this end, I asked two of my former
students to reflect on learning health insurance regulation and reform in my
Health Law and Policy class, and I discovered that some of my aims were
hitting the mark and others could benefit from refinement, in ways that I will
discuss below. In Part I of this Article, I describe my goals and approaches in
teaching these topics as well as why this material can be difficult to teach. My
student co-authors reflect on their own experiences in learning this material in
Part II, including what they took away from it and what questions remain. Both
of my co-authors have a deep interest in health law, and each came to my class
with different, relevant background knowledge and work experience. In the
final Part of the Article, I highlight how my co-authors’ insights have informed
my teaching.
I. REFLECTIONS ON TEACHING HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATION AND
REFORM
A.

What I Cover in a Health Law and Policy Survey Course

I teach health insurance regulation in two different settings: a seminar
focused specifically on this topic and a four-unit survey class on health law,
more broadly. Teaching the seminar is more straightforward. Fourteen weeks
are devoted exclusively to health insurance, which provides ample time to
cover both its normative and technical aspects. 5 Because it’s a seminar, the
students tend to have more tolerance for a sampling of topics and a
theoretically driven approach, with fewer seeking the legal practice version of
the material. Plus, having self-selected into a course focused solely on health
insurance, most students are actively interested in understanding the nuances of
the topic, as opposed to students who have enrolled in a survey course called
“Health Law and Policy.” In Spring of 2017, for example, the seminar students
enthusiastically spent five weeks researching and critiquing key policy
elements of Republican proposals to repeal and replace the ACA—ranging
from health savings accounts to insurance competition across state lines to

5. I spend the first several classes of my insurance seminar building a normative framework
for thinking about health insurance. The second part of the course—three to four classes—aims to
illustrate the status of health insurance and health care in the United States historically, before the
enactment of the ACA, employing empirical studies to tease out why we spend more on health
care and get worse outcomes than other countries do. The final and longest part of the seminar
examines how the ACA changed the world of health financing and regulation and selects from
hot topics in health insurance regulation and reform at the time of the class.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

414

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:411

block grants or per capita financing for the Medicaid program. The students
expect the course to be technical, and they generally embrace its complexity.
The task of teaching health insurance regulation in the survey course is
much more difficult and is the focus of the rest of this Article. UCLA Law
generally offers the health law survey course annually, and between twenty
and forty students enroll. The class covers topics related to law and medicine
(e.g., privacy, informed consent, medical malpractice), the more complex
regulatory health law topics (e.g., fraud and abuse laws, licensure and
accreditation, tax status, and antitrust), and health care financing regulation and
reform.
I spend about eight or nine two-hour class sessions on health care
financing: two classes that provide an overview of private health insurance,
public health insurance, and reimbursement (covering everything from how
hospitals set prices to Medicare reimbursement rules); three on managed care
liability and preemption doctrine under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA); 6 and three to four on the ACA and ongoing
health reform efforts. What results is an action-packed four weeks and a firehose introduction to one of the most complicated and important topics in health
law and indeed in modern American society.
B.

What Makes Things Challenging

Several factors make teaching health insurance regulation especially
difficult. Students’ reasons for taking a health law course diverge most
strongly in this unit. This is where the future health law practitioners part ways
from students who are simply seeking insight into a timely topic—one that
they see in the New York Times headlines and hear their medical student
friends and physician family members either cheering or complaining about.
The students who plan to practice health law know they must understand the
rules and regulatory structures of insurance. They will negotiate contracts
between insurers and providers or litigate them when they go wrong. They will
answer client questions about the ACA and about state insurance regulation
compliance. These students tend to push their way through difficult classes on
ERISA preemption and managed care liability because they expect knowing it
will behoove them in the long run. Students who come to the course for
general edification, however, can lose steam in these classes.
Another challenge is that individual preconceptions and biases can impede
learning. In 2009, I sat in on a seminar that now-Dean of University of
Pennsylvania Law School, Ted Ruger, was teaching as a visiting professor at
Harvard Law School. He devoted a class to discussion of the so-called
individual mandate to carry health insurance—then a requirement just in

6. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified in part at 29 U.S.C. ch. 18).
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Massachusetts 7 and the topic that I examined during my fellowship at
Harvard. 8 He asked the students their opinions about it, and, from a crowd of
well-educated Harvard law students, he got a typical, and relatively
uninformed, “young invincible”-style response: self-interested resistance to
having to pay more than one’s “fair” share. The twenty-something law students
uniformly saw it as patently unfair (to them) and, as a result, bad public policy.
This viewpoint is endemic in our individualistic, bootstrap society and can
impede a student’s ability to internalize evidence that could persuade one to
believe otherwise—that the individual mandate might be a just policy. It also
arises from a shallow or narrow understanding of insurance. Even if insurers
had perfect information, it would be impossible to price insurance so that it
precisely captures individual risk (in other words, there is no perfectly
actuarially “fair” insurance). 9 Though some expensive conditions recur from
year to year, many expensive health risks are unpredictable and
uncontrollable. 10 This viewpoint also typically assumes that people in poor
health have had some hand in it themselves. Thus, it would make sense to
charge them more if they are unhealthy of their own accord; but designating
what is under someone’s control—and, by implication, less worthy of
collective assistance—is more complicated than what appears at first blush.
Even risk factors, such as smoking or poor nutrition, that seem to be within an
individual’s full control, may not be. 11 Knowing and internalizing these
facts—that insurance could never be “fair” from an actuarial perspective and
that, for the most part, people cannot control whether they need expensive

7. An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care, 2006 Mass.
Acts 77, 92 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, § 2 (2008)).
8. Allison K. Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented Markets,
and Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2010).
9. While some believe that an efficient insurance market could eliminate interpersonal
redistribution by charging each individual a perfectly actuarially rated premium (defined as the
exact amount the individual is likely to consume in health care costs over the coverage period),
the reality is that even in the most “efficient” of insurance markets, insurance is redistributive
among insureds. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 77–78 (1986).
10. Mark W. Stanton, The High Concentration of U.S. Health Care Expenditures,
RESEARCH IN ACTION, June 2006, at 1, 5 (“An acute episode of pneumonia or a motor vehicle
accident might lead to an expensive hospitalization for an otherwise healthy person, who might
be in the top 1 percent for just that year but have few expenses in subsequent years.”).
11. See Jonathan S. Feinstein, The Relationship Between Socioeconomic Status and Health:
A Review of the Literature, 71 MILBANK Q. 279, 306 (1993); Neil Pearce & George Davey Smith,
Is Social Capital the Key to Inequalities in Health?, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 122, 125 (2003)
(describing that health is related to social factors because of “the influence of social cohesion on
health-related behaviors”); see also S.A. Reijneveld, The Impact of Individual and Area
Characteristics on Urban Socioeconomic Differences in Health and Smoking, 27 INT’L J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 33, 35, 38 (1998) (finding that poor health behaviors in impoverished areas
overwhelmingly are due to individuals’ low socioeconomic status).
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medical care—makes it harder to take the young invincible stance of indignant
opposition to mandatory insurance coverage.
Yet another challenge is that insurance regulation is a daunting topic, even
for the most ambitious student. Students must first understand how insurance
works. Insurance is about managing and spreading risk, and risk is a
notoriously difficult concept to understand. 12 It deals in probabilities and
unusual events that are often hard to relate to. Regulations, in turn, aim to keep
insurers financially solvent and to direct how risk is spread, and among whom.
These basic concepts are intimidating, even to many law professors.
To make matters worse, there is no singular approach to health insurance
in the United States. In many other countries, students would find something
more akin to an insurance “system,” as a starting point. 13 The United States
lacks a singular, coherent health insurance system. 14 Rather, Americans
finance their health care in many ways, each regulated differently. 15 At the
highest conceptual level, people pay for care with private insurance, public
insurance, or out of pocket. 16 Each of these categories divides into many
subcategories. Private insurance is most often obtained through an employer, a
particular defining characteristic of the U.S. approach. But some people buy it
on their own directly from an insurer, increasingly so after the ACA made it
easier for people to get and afford insurance in this way. 17 Public financing
also takes various forms. Medicaid, which is the largest public insurance
program, currently insures about sixty-two million low-income or disabled

12. For an overview of cognitive biases with respect to risk and uncertainty, see Christine
Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 203–25 (2006). See
also Howell E. Jackson, Accounting for Social Security Benefits, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC
FINANCE 261, 271–75 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006).
13. This assertion is not completely true, because most countries’ health financing systems
involve some mix of public and private insurance, but most do have a more straightforward
primary, typically public mode of financing insurance for the whole population that people can
subsequently add onto or opt out of. See, e.g., THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AT THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE
DIVIDE: A GLOBAL COMPARATIVE STUDY (Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross eds., 2014)
(cataloging the mix of public and private health care financing in over a dozen heterogeneous
countries).
14. See THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS (Einer
Elhauge ed., 2010).
15. See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Access to Health Insurance and Health Benefits, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman &
William M. Sage eds., 2017) (describing each of these forms of payment, as well as charity care
and government provision).
16. Id.
17. In 2015, 177 million people reported employer-based private coverage and 50 million
reported directly purchased health insurance coverage. JESSICA C. BARNETT & MARINA S.
VORNOVITSKY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES:
2015, at 4 (2016).
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beneficiaries using both state and federal funds. 18 Before the ACA, Medicaid
eligibility was “categorical” (and it still is in some states). Eligibility was not
simply based on being poor. To qualify, an individual also needed to be under
age eighteen, a parent of a dependent child, pregnant, or disabled. The secondlargest public insurance program, Medicare, covers fifty-two million elderly or
disabled individuals. 19 Other public programs provide benefits for children
whose families’ incomes are too high to qualify for Medicaid (State Children’s
Health Insurance Program), American Indians and Alaska Natives (Indian
Health Service) and military and veterans (TRICARE and CHAMPUS). And,
even after major reform aimed at increasing the number of insured Americans,
nine percent of people remain uninsured, some of whom fell through the cracks
of the ACA 20 and others, mostly undocumented immigrants, who were
intentionally excluded. 21
A student must understand this convoluted picture of health care financing
before beginning to examine its regulation. Take, for example, the legal
question of whether a managed care company may be liable for denying a
beneficiary medical care. To answer this question, it is necessary first to
identify if the beneficiary gets her health benefits through an employer, on her
own from an insurance company, or from a public source. Next, a student must
understand the business structure of the plan. Who makes utilization decisions?
Are the doctors employed, or are they independent contractors? How are
doctors paid and does the payment structure affect medical decisions and
denials? 22 These threshold questions, necessary precursors to assessing
liability, can themselves be difficult to grasp.
A final challenge for students is that health insurance policy and doctrine
are steeped in questions of politics and morality, especially so with respect to
legal challenges to the ACA, a lightning rod for conflicting social values.

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Of those people still uninsured in 2015, when asked their primary reason for being
uninsured, nearly half reported that insurance remains too expensive, nine percent said that they
chose not to buy insurance, twenty percent said that they did not know about or think that the
individual mandate applies to them, and eleven percent tried to get coverage and failed. Key Facts
About the Uninsured Population, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Sept 29, 2016), http://kff.org/un
insured/fact-sheet/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-population/ [https://perma.cc/B6GY-AZXR].
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). This
is the first case on managed care liability in the Health Care Law and Ethics textbook edited by
Hall, Bobinski, and Orentlicher. To understand the court’s decision, readers must understand that
the HMO contracts with doctors who are organized within an Independent Practice Association,
where physicians receive capitated payments and year-end bonuses, depending on patients’
specialist and hospital utilization. Just to understand this arrangement is difficult yet necessary to
make sense of the court’s decision that there is a colorable question of fact with regard to liability
for the health maintenance organization in this case.
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National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius’s inquiry into the
legality of the individual mandate had as much to do with conflict over who
should pay for health care and who should be able to get it as it did about what
Congress can do according to Article I of the Constitution—even though
Justice Roberts’s opinion, for the most part, expressly rests on the latter. 23 The
broad-reaching displacement of state insurance regulation by ERISA is shaped
more by the business lobby and the particular stronghold of employersponsored insurance than by any clear picture of statutory intent. To
understand the development of legal doctrine, students must be willing to delve
equally into the explicit reasoning of each case and the normative and political
questions underlying it.
C. My Strategies (and Gimmicks)
To overcome the challenges of teaching this complex, technical, and
controversial subject, I attempt to tie the technical aspects of health insurance
to a human face, highlighting the impact on individuals. Every student has a
story of her experiences with the health care system and with health insurance,
related to her own health, a parent’s health, or, as came up in class this past
fall, with a pet’s health and health insurance (in all seriousness). This personal
contact makes it easier for students to think about the practical impact of health
insurance regulation. I offer here five examples of the types of images, videos,
and hypotheticals on which I rely to attempt to make difficult aspects of health
insurance regulation more human and accessible. In addition, I share my own
experiences navigating health insurance and health care choices and, even with
my expertise, how I have found doing so frustrating or impossible at times. My
general approach is to dive deeply into the technical aspects and then to
resurface to consider the broader effect of the technical rules on individuals,
families, and communities.
1.

The Health Care Spending Curve: A Picture that Is Worth a Thousand
Words to Introduce Health Insurance Theory

On day one of my health law class, I introduce the idea of insurance,
including what it is, how it works, and what types of normative questions it
raises. I begin with the famous curve of health care spending to illustrate the
80/20 rule (a version of which is illustrated in Figure 1 24)—that twenty percent
of the population is responsible for eighty percent of the health care spending
every year.

23. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
24. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT., UNDERSTANDING U.S. HEALTH
CARE SPENDING 3 (July 2011), http://www.bcnys.org/inside/health/2011/HealthCarePremiums
NIHCM0711.pdf [https://perma.cc/WP7P-YJL3] (analyzing data from the National Health
Expenditure Accounts at cms.gov).
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Figure 1. Distribution of Health Care Spending in 2008
Most health law professors probably introduce this curve at some point in
the semester. I start with this image on day one for two reasons. The first is
simply to get my students to understand the risk-spreading function of
insurance. Some people will spend more on health care this year than they
could possibly afford on their own, more in fact than the average U.S.
household earns in a year and more even than the median household’s net
worth. 25 Then I ask them to consider who makes up the space under that curve,
and we imagine the many people who might have an expensive year, from the
middle-aged man who has a heart attack, to the woman who has a baby, to the
twenty-something with a chronic disease, to the child diagnosed with leukemia
or born prematurely, to the paradigmatic aging person in need of constant care.
This exercise humanizes the curve and illustrates that an insurance risk pool is
just a group of individuals, like those sitting together in the classroom. Next,
we discuss predictability of being in the high end of the spending curve—some

25. The average household income was $56,516 in 2015. BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR ET AL.,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015, at 5 (Sept. 2016),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/p60-256.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P7MB-93KX]. Median household net worth was $68,828 in 2011. MARINA
VORNOVITSKY ET AL., DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD WEALTH IN THE U.S.: 2000 TO 2011, at 7,
https://www.census.gov/people/wealth/files/Wealth%20distribution%202000%20to%202011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PM8D-J9GJ]. Average spending for the top one percent of spenders in 2009
was on average $90,000 and for the top five percent was on average $41,000. NAT’L INST. FOR
HEALTH CARE MGMT., THE CONCENTRATION OF HEALTH CARE SPENDING 2 (July 2012),
http://www.nihcm.org/pdf/DataBrief3%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3CR-EGX8].

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

420

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:411

are there more predictably, like the person with a chronic disease or the woman
who had a baby, while others find themselves there with little to no warning
due to a diagnosis of cancer, a heart attack, or a car accident. 26 It is, at least to
some degree, impossible to know which person in the pool will be expensive
this year.
The second reason I spend time with this image on the first day is to begin
to frame different normative visions of health insurance, contrasting in
particular one of actuarial fairness versus one of solidarity. 27 Considering that
some people are very expensive and sometimes for reasons outside of their
control, who should bear the costs of their medical care?
For those who ascribe to a model of actuarial fairness, in a perfect world,
over a lifetime, an insured individual would only pay in premiums what she
spends on health care (plus administrative costs and reasonable insurer profit).
Insurance is like a borrowing and savings mechanism. Some years an insured
individual pays more than she spends and others she pays less than she needs,
but if insurance works “correctly,” she comes out even or near even over the
course of her lifetime. This first vision favors only intrapersonal distribution of
health care costs over a lifetime.
A contrasting vision is that insurance does and should facilitate
redistribution. 28 In a perfect world, an insured would pay premiums hoping
that she never needs to use those dollars on her own care and that, instead, they
pay for care for people who are less lucky than she is. This second vision is
based on interpersonal distribution of health care costs and insurance as a form
of social solidarity, a mechanism where everyone contributes so that the less
fortunate are able to access the care they need. In this view of insurance, the
goal is to distribute resources from the flat of the curve on the left side of
Figure 1—from the fifty percent of people in the United States who spend
nothing on health care in a given year—to those in the steep of the curve that
year, who likely could not finance the care they need out-of-pocket. This is a
more capacious view of what justice demands and one that I plant in my
students’ minds early so that, even if they disagree with it, they will at least be
cognizant of this alternative as the semester rolls out.
2.

Insurance Gaps Before and After the Affordable Care Act Through
the Lens of One Man’s Search for Health Insurance

Later in the semester, I begin the health care financing unit with two days
on public and private health insurance, describing the evolution and

26. Stanton, supra note 10, at 5.
27. See, e.g., Deborah Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH
POL., POL’Y & L. 287, 289 (1993) (outlining two visions of distributive justice for health
insurance, solidarity versus actuarial fairness).
28. Id.
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implications of how we pay for health care in the United States. At the end of
these classes, to make sure the students understand the many parts in
application, I pose a hypothetical about Rick, a fifty-year-old man living in
Tennessee who has a chronic health condition and has been laid off from a
relatively low-wage job, leaving him unemployed and living off meager
unemployment benefits. I ask the students what his options were for
maintaining health insurance, which he critically needs, before the ACA. 29 The
answer emerges that he had no viable option. Some people in his position
might take advantage of COBRA, a federal law preceding the ACA that allows
some people with employer health plans to keep their same coverage for at
least eighteen months after losing a job. 30 But, to do so, Rick would have to
pay the full cost of the health insurance benefits, including the employer’s
former contribution plus his own, which he cannot afford. As a single adult, he
was not categorically eligible for Medicaid before the ACA—at least not until
his disease results in disability. He is not old enough for Medicare. He suffers
from a preexisting health condition that would have precluded him from
purchasing affordable individual coverage. He is sick and out of luck. In fact,
his inability to get health insurance, despite his desperate need for it, is
emblematic of what motivated the passage of the ACA.
Then, we consider if he is better off after the ACA. Unfortunately, the
answer is no, providing an interesting twist on this hypothetical that I used for
years prior to the ACA’s passage to illustrate the need for reform. Under the
original design of the ACA, he would have had access to Medicaid since he
earns under the federal poverty level. The ACA directed that states eliminate
categorical eligibility so that anyone earning under 138% of the federal poverty
level could enroll in Medicaid. States that did not expand eligibility risked
losing the entirety of the federal funding they were getting for Medicaid.
Responding to a legal challenge to this requirement, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that this choice—to expand or else lose the federal funds that constitute on
average ten percent of a state’s budget—was unconstitutionally coercive. 31 As
a result of this decision, a state can now choose either to keep its pre-ACA
categorical eligibility rules and funding levels or to expand its program to
everyone earning up to 138% of the federal poverty level and receive
additional federal funding. As of January 2017, thirty-two states had adopted
the expansion. 32

29. I believe this hypothetical is loosely based on a slide authored by Sara Rosenbaum.
30. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272,
§ 1001(c)(2), 100 Stat. 82, 223–24.
31. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2574 (2012).
32. Current Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION
(Jan. 1, 2017), http://kff.org/health-reform/slide/current-status-of-the-medicaid-expansion-deci
sion/ [https://perma.cc/9ZAS-PYGW].
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Rick’s home state of Tennessee did not expand its Medicaid program;
rather, it maintained pre-ACA categorical eligibility rules. As a result, Rick
now embodies an unfortunate unintended result of the ACA. He earns too little
to qualify for subsidized private insurance on the ACA’s health insurance
exchanges, which the ACA made available only to people earning 100% to
400% of the federal poverty level based on the assumption that anyone earning
under 100% would be eligible for Medicaid coverage, and he does not have
access to Medicaid in light of the Supreme Court’s decision. The process of
thinking through every different iteration and realizing that Rick, a middleaged man with a chronic health condition, has no viable option for insurance
coverage even after the ACA is eye-opening for many of my students. It brings
to life the problems of building out reform on a fragmented financing system.
3.

Investigative Journalism on Out-of-Network Pricing and the Games
Providers Pay

I spend one class explicitly discussing the price of health care and
approach it in an intentionally provocative way, by highlighting some of the
worst practices, including chargemaster pricing, which can result in
indefensibly high medical bills for uninsured patients, and providers’ behavior
to maximize Medicare reimbursement, which toes the line between strategic
and fraudulent. Students read Steven Brill’s famous Time Magazine article
“Bitter Pill,” 33 exposing inflated hospital list prices, and a series of Wall Street
Journal articles on health care pricing and billing practices from the “Medicare
Unmasked” series that won the Journal a Pulitzer Prize in investigative
reporting in 2015. This year, I added articles about the astronomical increases
in prices for prescription drugs and medical devices when they come under the
ownership of for-profit companies like Valeant, Turing Pharmaceuticals, and
Mylan (whose six-fold increase in the price of the life-saving EpiPen device
recently captured the public’s attention). 34 In each of these articles, the writer
emphasizes the human impact of high health care prices: low-income people
filing for bankruptcy over six-figure medical bills or scrambling to figure out
how to pay for life-saving treatment, older people suffering harms from being
discharged from skilled nursing facilities too quickly or being held there longer
than ideal for their rehabilitation, and parents struggling to afford potentially
life-saving EpiPens for their children with allergies.
Each of these pieces is shocking. My goal is provocation, in part. It is also
to make explicit that health care is a business, and often an extremely
profitable one, where business decisions cost people their health or their lives.
Finally, I highlight that any financing system creates incentives, and people
33. Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills Are Killing Us, TIME (Feb. 20, 2013).
34. See Jonathan D. Rockoff, Mylan Faces Scrutiny Over EpiPen Price Increases, WALL ST.
J. (Aug. 24, 2016).
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respond to those incentives. This is useful framing for later discussion of selfreferral and anti-kickback laws.
4.

Video Hypothetical on the Bottom Line of ERISA Preemption

With ERISA preemption, we delve more deeply into the technical than
with any other unit in the class. ERISA, passed in 1974, regulates employee
benefits; the law was passed to create safeguards for pensions but included
health and other employee benefits in its regulatory ambit as an afterthought, 35
one that has had a tremendous impact. This is because ERISA preempts, or
pushes aside, state laws and remedies that overlap with it, and has left a
vacuum of regulation and remedies in its wake. The law directs that ERISA
supersedes any state laws that “relate to” an employer health plan, known as
section 514 preemption. ERISA also prevents someone from seeking state
remedies if she is harmed because of a denial of benefits under an employer
health plan, known as section 502 preemption. 36 ERISA preemption is
difficult, both because of its complexity and because of the inconsistency in the
way the Supreme Court has interpreted the statute. Yet for students interested
in health reform or civil justice, who need a functional understanding of how
benefits are regulated, understanding ERISA is critical.
There is real risk of losing some students in the ERISA morass and never
getting them back again. I rely on several tools to try to keep students aboard.
First, I chart out ERISA preemption visually, using everything from pictures of
concentric circles of preemption (Figure 2, below) to flowcharts. 37 I start with
this simple visual to illustrate how the two parts of ERISA preemption work
together, and as the unit proceeds, I plot each case onto this roadmap.

35. See JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974:
A POLITICAL HISTORY 2 (2004).
36. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 502(a)(1)(B),
88 Stat. 829, 891 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)).
37. Thank you to Jessica Mantel for sharing her fabulous flowcharts with me.
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Figure 2. Charting ERISA Preemption
Second, I strategically place our unit on the Affordable Care Act right after
ERISA preemption to reel possible defectors back in. Finally, and most
importantly, I attempt to illuminate the human impact of ERISA preemption
using an in-class exercise, so students understand and remember the bottom
line of this technical jurisprudence, even if they forget all the doctrinal details.
This exercise focuses on ERISA section 502, which allows beneficiaries to
bring a federal civil suit if denied benefits owed under an employer health
plan. 38 The Supreme Court has interpreted section 502 to preclude any state
tort action seeking remedy for harms that arise from such a denial. 39 This
means that the only way a person can seek remedy for these harms is in federal
court under ERISA section 502. In conjunction, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the remedies available under section 502 very narrowly, allowing
compensation only for the value of benefits denied and the payment of future
benefits. 40 As a result, if a beneficiary is denied care due to her under her
employer health plan and she is seriously harmed because of that denial,
ERISA leaves her without remedy for these harms. She can recoup the cost of

38. Section 502(a)(1)(B) says that a beneficiary may bring a civil action to “recover benefits
due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to
clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.” § 502(a)(1)(B), 88 Stat. at 891.
39. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210 (2004).
40. Id. at 222–23 (Ginsburg J., concurring). See Varhola v. Doe, 820 F.2d 809, 817 (6th Cir.
1987); Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532, 534–38 (9th Cir. 1986); Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d
651, 754–61 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 818 (1992).
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care denied but not damages related to lost work or disability or death that
results from the denial.
Even after we discuss the case that expressly affirms this rule, Aetna v.
Davila, it can still be difficult for students to internalize its counterintuitive
and, arguably, cruel results: a health plan that negligently denies someone care
does not have to compensate her for harms that result. In a concurring opinion,
Justice Ginsburg expresses her disapproval of this rule, calling on Congress to
revisit an “unjust” preemption regime. 41
To drive home this lesson, I use a video hypothetical from an NBC Nightly
News story about Michael Fields, a forty-six-year-old man whose insurer
repeatedly denied his physician’s request for a cardiac nuclear stress test to
look for blockages in his arteries. 42 The news story is instructive at multiple
levels. First, the test was denied by a company called MedSolutions, a medical
benefits management company that was hired to review requests on behalf of
Fields’s insurer, Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Delaware. Students can consider
how the existence of a company like MedSolutions fits into the story of
defensive medicine. Studies point to increased use of diagnostics, especially in
cardiovascular care, as a response to tort liability concerns. 43 MedSolutions
could, in theory, use evidence-based medicine to counterbalance unwarranted
overuse, but, in reality, it went too far. An investigation by the U.S. Senate
Commerce Committee showed a pattern of inappropriate denials, perhaps
unsurprising considering that MedSolutions’s compensation was contingent on
achieving at least a twenty percent reduction in spending. 44
Fields’s denial was among those identified as wrongful. His doctor
recommended the nuclear stress test; when the insurer denied it, the doctor
appealed twice and both times the appeals were again denied. I ask students:
“What if his doctor had given up at this point? Could the doctor be liable for
negligent care? Would the insurer, or its agent, be liable for any harms Fields
suffered because of this wrongful denial?” This last question is the one that
reinforces the impact of ERISA preemption. Fields would have had to bring a
federal claim for wrongful denial of benefits under ERISA section 502,
because ERISA preempts any state tort claim. And if he won, he would recover
only the value of benefits denied: the cost of the nuclear stress test. The
question that drives home the enduring effect of ERISA preemption coupled

41. Davila, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J. concurring).
42. Lisa Myers, Rich Gardella & Azriel Relph, Insurer Denied Needed Medical Tests,
Senate Finds, NBC NIGHTLY NEWS WITH BRIAN WILLIAMS (Apr. 18, 2011, 11:43 AM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42613298/ns/nbc_nightly_news_with_brian_williams/t/insurer-de
nied-needed-medical-tests-senate-finds/#.WAfnpJMrJo4 [https://perma.cc/82X3-MW5T].
43. See, e.g., Katherine Baicker, Elliott S. Fisher & Amitabh Chandra, Malpractice Liability
Costs and the Practice of Medicine in the Medicare Program, 26 HEALTH AFF. 841 (2007).
44. Myers et al., supra note 42.
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with the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of its available remedies is the
following: “If Fields had died the following week of a heart attack because he
did not get a timely nuclear stress test, what remedy could his widow have
been able to seek in court?” The answer, students realize with disbelief, is the
same: the cost of the stress test. Period. 45
Fortunately for Fields, his determined doctor sent him to the hospital for
emergency care, where cardiologists found an artery blocked and performed
quadruple heart bypass surgery the following day. By shifting to video and a
compelling human story, I attempt to capture my students’ attention and
heartstrings in order to underscore the impact of complex ERISA doctrine.
Even if they do not remember the details of sections 514 and 502, most
remember the story of Michael Fields.
5.

Buying Insurance on an ACA Exchange: This Cannot Be What They
Intended?

Finally, as we study the ACA and its insurance expansion, I ask my
students to judge the effects of one part of the ACA expansion for themselves.
I ask them to choose a health plan on the California health insurance exchange,
Covered California, which has a shop-and-compare function for potential
buyers.
The experience of going onto Covered California’s website, entering their
data, and trying to pick a plan usually illuminates several things. First,
“choice” is a myth to a large degree in a world where plans are highly
regulated. The benefits and cost-sharing structures are surprisingly similar
among plans in similar categories, or “metal levels” (so named because plans
are designated as platinum, gold, silver, or bronze, in order of decreasing
actuarial value). Second, to the extent the plans are at all distinguishable on
their face, the choice between plans is unnavigable even for discerning law
students. It’s difficult to tell why premium prices differ from one plan to
another, and to the extent premium variation is due to differences in provider
networks, it is impossible to decipher and judge the relative value of different
networks, especially in California where online provider directories are riddled
with errors. 46 There are consumer ratings on the plans, but it is unclear how
reliable they may be or what exactly they reflect. Finally, when looking at
45. This example is a slight oversimplification because it shows a pattern and practice of
wrongful denials that might expose MedSolutions and Blue Cross/Blue Shield to other legal
claims, but the takeaway is that the most straightforward claim for wrongful denial of benefits
would not allow a remedy for wrongful death.
46. See MANATT HEALTH & CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE FOUND., DIRECTORY ASSISTANCE:
MAINTAINING RELIABLE PROVIDER DIRECTORIES FOR HEALTH PLAN SHOPPERS 3, 5–6 (2015),
http://www.chcf.org/~/media/MEDIA%20LIBRARY%20Files/PDF/PDF%20D/PDF%20Directo
ryAssistanceProvider.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7FB-2T55] (describing problems with the accuracy
of California provider directories).
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plans, students struggle to decide if it is better to pay more upfront for a plan
with a low deductible or to risk it, opt for a high-deductible plan, and hope for
a healthy year.
In one fell swoop, this exercise pulls the rug out from under the idea of
relying on smart consumer purchase decisions to send market signals to
improve health insurance and health care delivery—the theoretical idea
underlying the exchanges and much of modern health law and policy,
including recent Republican proposals for reform. 47 It reveals that, even in a
state with a relatively good marketplace experience, most insurance consumers
are taking a shot in the dark.
II. REFLECTIONS ON LEARNING HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATION AND
REFORM
Since all these efforts are aimed at helping my students understand health
insurance regulation and reform, I thought it would be useful to hear from the
intended audience. This Part is authored by two of my former students,
Whitney Brown and Lindsay Cutler, who discuss why they took Health Law
and Policy, what they found most interesting or memorable about the unit on
insurance regulation and reform, and what they were left wondering or wanting
to know at the end of the semester. Of course, every student’s experience is
different, but my hope is that these reflections illuminate what comes through
most strongly to my students and what would benefit from more refinement,
which I address briefly in the Conclusion.
A.

Defining “Health Law”: Reflections by Whitney Brown

I came to law school with a particular interest in health law, having
previously studied public health in a master’s program and having been
steeped in the health policy world while working in several congressional
offices on Capitol Hill during the years immediately following the passage of
the Affordable Care Act. What attracted me to a course in health law was thus
a combination of motivations—a desire for information that I might one day
use in practice, an interest in the discipline that grew out of my own
(sometimes harrowing) brushes with the health care system and health
insurance specifically, and a general scholarly curiosity about the areas of
health law that I had not previously encountered. Admittedly, I also sought a
compelling answer to a recurrent question from extended family and garrulous
airplane row-mates: “Oh, you’re interested in health law? What is health law?”

47. Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed Competition, 12 HEALTH
AFF. 24 (1993); see Allison K. Hoffman, Health Care’s Market Bureaucracy (draft on file with
author).
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What differentiated the classes devoted to health insurance and financing
from other parts of the course was how implicit policy decisions are in shaping
these areas of law. During other units, Professor Hoffman would pause
instruction after identifying the black letter law so that we could weigh the
implications of the rules or doctrines we were learning (e.g., Should physicians
have a duty to treat patients? Are EMTALA’s 48 requirements of screening,
stabilization, and transfer for emergency medical services a net positive or net
negative for our health care system?). While discussing health insurance
regulation, however, questions about social values were ubiquitous and
unavoidable—choices about what our health system should prioritize so clearly
undergirded every design decision, from how managed care is structured to the
rationale for applying ACA cost-sharing subsidies only to plans silver-level or
higher in value, that engaging in full-stop policy discussions would have been
redundant. The ultimate effect of regulatory choices or specific provisions of
the ACA became clear only when judged as part of the law’s overall design
and the shape of the health care system as a whole, as the Supreme Court’s
decision in King v. Burwell49 so distinctly demonstrated. In other words, it
became clear to me that it is no more possible to extract and divorce a
particular health law doctrine from its social and political implications than it
is to view a statutory provision in isolation from its surrounding statutory
context.
This recognition that normative decisions were inextricable from the
doctrine itself—and that in enacting a statute or promulgating an insurance
regulation, Congress and administrative agencies, respectively, must confront
difficult questions about who should be covered, when, and why—is what
made the insurance unit among the most illuminating of the semester. And it
unexpectedly shifted the way I think about areas of law that are similarly laced
with thorny contextual and normative decisions, such as business, tax, and
administrative law. Rather than merely learning and mentally filing away the
black letter law, I found myself trying to get to the bottom of the should and
the why of the doctrine as I read—for instance, should the degree of deference
a court gives an executive agency depend on whether the agency is attempting
to enhance regulation of an industry or to deregulate? Why is the interest on a
home mortgage tax deductible but rent is not? What normative choices
underlie this decision? Having developed a heightened attention to underlying
policy and normative decisions while studying health insurance regulation, I
feel more attuned to the richness and complexity of legal doctrines generally.
Within only weeks of beginning the course, I realized that health law—and
health insurance regulation in particular—was far more pervasive and
multifaceted than I had previously understood. Before taking the class, I
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012).
49. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
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thought of health law, and health insurance regulation in particular, as a fairly
idiosyncratic field. I was surprised to learn instead that it poses many of the
same questions that regularly occupy the federal judiciary in other contexts:
How are we to understand Congress’s commerce power? 50 To what extent
should context and congressional intent be considered when interpreting a
potentially ambiguous statute? 51 How broadly should “personhood” be
construed? 52 When should justiciability concerns preclude a court from ruling
on the merits of a claim? 53 How does (or should) the Court interpret
preemption language in federal statutes (e.g., ERISA’s “relates to”) and how
do such decisions affect the balance of power between state and federal
governments? 54 It was both surprising and refreshing to recognize that
understanding modern jurisprudence, especially after the passage of the ACA,
essentially requires an understanding of health insurance (and, similarly, that
understanding health insurance demands engaging with the Court’s recent
jurisprudence).
Perhaps the greatest challenge of learning this material was to master the
details without losing sight of the big picture. It became clear to me that
tugging at any of the threads we were learning could yield a trove of
fascinating policy decisions and political backdrop—much of which was
beyond the scope of a fourteen-week course. How and why were certain
essential health benefits chosen for guaranteed coverage under the ACA, and
others left out? How is it that the law could have overlooked such glaring gaps
in coverage as those exemplified by the “family glitch” 55 or the “Rick from
Tennessee” example that Professor Hoffman discusses above? 56 Stepping back
from these in-the-weeds questions, more foundational inquiries often loomed.
Why does health insurance remain so often tied to employment, particularly
today when the average baby boomer holds more than eleven jobs before the
age of fifty? 57 Does this system still make sense? What would an alternative
50. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
51. See, e.g., King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
52. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2797 (2014).
53. See, e.g., U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 67–69 (D.D.C.
2015).
54. See, e.g., Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016).
55. Tricia Brooks, Health Policy Brief: The Family Glitch, HEALTH AFF. (Nov. 10, 2014),
http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_129.pdf [https://perma.cc/
JX6H-PHRD] (“The problem is that the definition of ‘affordable’—for both an individual
employee and a family—is based only on the cost of individual-only coverage and does not take
into consideration the often significantly higher cost of a family plan.”).
56. See supra Part I.C.2.
57. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NEWS RELEASE: NUMBER OF JOBS HELD, LABOR
MARKET ACTIVITY, AND EARNINGS GROWTH AMONG THE YOUNGEST BABY BOOMERS:
RESULTS FROM A LONGITUDINAL SURVEY 2 (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
pdf/nlsoy.pdf [https://perma.cc/5X8J-N9TN].
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look like? More than most classes, this one left me craving more—more
context, more political backdrop, more comparative information about how the
challenges of our health care system measure up to those of other countries,
more insight into how health insurance will be conceptualized and effectuated
in the future. I may have left the class with more questions than answers—
questions that have only become more urgent in the wake of the 2016 election,
as we await the future of the ACA and health care regulation—but for me,
these questions affirm my interest in continuing to examine this extensive field
of law.
B.

Challenging Preconceptions of Health Care Reform: Reflections by
Lindsay Cutler

An interest in health care access is what led me to Health Law and Policy
at UCLA. Prior to law school, I worked on the outreach campaign for NMHIX,
the New Mexico Health Insurance Exchange, and on the New Mexico
Medicaid expansion. After seeing the implementation of the ACA on the
ground, I imagined the entire course would be a semester of precisely the
health insurance regulation and reform “fire-hose” this Article discusses.
While I quickly found out that health law and policy is broader than I had
anticipated, I looked forward most to the part of the course on the ACA. The
process of learning about health insurance reform felt like a sort of bungeejump—a plunge into the technical depths of ERISA or legal challenges to the
ACA’s individual mandate 58 and then rebounding to ask 10,000-foot questions
about how the ACA attempted to fill in the cracks in health care access and to
wrap around such an employer-dependent health care financing system.
As became most clear to me in this unit, there is something unique about
studying health care in a law school classroom—few subjects taught in law
school are as deeply personal. Throughout the semester my classmates and I
connected with the material in many different ways, as revealed through
anecdotes about run-ins with student health insurance or past professional
experience in the health care field. The unit on health insurance regulation and
reform was the part of the class where I saw our entry points into the material
diverging the most. Some classmates’ perspectives stemmed from the
physician in their family, others from a sick relative or from being denied
insurance coverage because of a preexisting condition. This vast array of
background perspectives, compounded by the effect of the headline news
shaping our frames of reference, fueled our perceptions and misperceptions of
the subject. For example, many of us, accustomed to hearing that the ACA
offered affordable coverage for all, were shocked to find out just how many
58. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012) (holding that the
individual mandate to purchase health insurance under the Affordable Care Act was constitutional
under the Tax and Spending Clause).
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people were left out of the expansion and just how many holes remained after
the ACA’s patchworking. Professor Hoffman navigated our different
perspectives by reminding us of the big picture: whether it was a colorful
hypothetical or our own experience, these individualized interactions with
insurance and doctors were powerfully indicative of the path that health care
reform was taking.
The area I recall struggling with most was the concept of ERISA
preemption and the gap that remains for those whose only remedy for wrongful
denial of benefits in an employer health plan is the nominal payment of
benefits denied and of future benefits, since ERISA preempts state tort claims
and remedies for harms stemming from such denials. 59 Though not the subject
I was most excited to learn, seeing the pitfalls of ERISA strengthened my
understanding of the evolution of health care financing in the United States. To
me, the takeaway from ERISA was that it denied individuals caught between
state and federal law meaningful access to the health care system. I saw ERISA
as representative of the extent to which market forces shape insurance in the
public and private spheres and the way in which the struggle for regulation of
employer-based insurance is rife with public and administrative tensions.
Moving from ground level to 10,000 and then 30,000 feet by
understanding first the technicalities and then the policy implications of
ERISA preemption also helped me see how the macro goals of health care
reform—increasing access, reducing cost, and improving quality—can pull in
opposite directions. Though limiting benefits may reduce spending for
employee plans, individuals can also be denied life-saving treatment or be
barred from accessing meaningful care. The complexity of ERISA, and the
market forces at play in removing employee claims from state law through
preemption, deepened my appreciation of how the systems I had previously
worked with on the ground, NMHIX and New Mexico Medicaid, were in
theory designed to do the opposite: to increase access to meaningful care,
where such access may not have previously existed. It seems even more
important, in the context of ERISA’s impact, for individuals, even possibly
those who are able to obtain benefits through an employee plan, to have the
option to access health care outside of the employer context. Having the ability
to purchase a plan on the health care exchange and, in turn, to seek full legal
recourse for harms stemming from benefits denials is another way that the
exchanges and Medicaid expansion could provide increased access.
What struck me most deeply in thinking about the particular reforms the
ACA embraced was an article we started the course with entitled “Getting
There from Here,” by Dr. Atul Gawande. In it Gawande describes the pathdependent nature of health reform in various countries over the last century. 60
59. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 204 (2004).
60. Atul Gawande, Getting There from Here, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 26, 2009).
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Gawande, writing before the ACA passed, tracked other countries’ health care
systems, reforms, and problems to their social and political roots—what he
called their particular origin stories. 61 Path dependence, as presented in the
article, is the theory that small, historical events play a powerful and
underestimated role in shaping current health care reform. This article helped
me understand how U.S. health care financing came to be so patchworked, and
I have returned to it repeatedly both for answers and for inspiration for further
study.
I walked away from Health Law and Policy with a deeper understanding of
the complexity of our health care system’s problems and the rationales behind
the ACA’s often perplexing policies. But so much of what I loved learning and
found fascinating and motivating a year ago has changed since the November
2016 election. Taking this survey course in the Spring of 2016 and reflecting
on it in the months since has taught me to think critically about the design of
essential care systems, who and what they are intended to exclude, and how
that reflects national social values. My health law classmates and I are
certainly not the only ones thinking about these underlying social values at
present, as moves to dismantle the ACA have provoked Americans and others
around the globe to ask, sometimes in gut-turning disbelief, “wait, just how do
we get there from here?”
CONCLUSION:
WHAT I TAKE AWAY FROM MY STUDENTS FOR MY FUTURE TEACHING
My conversations with Lindsay and Whitney and their reflections on
learning in my class affirmed that teaching health insurance regulation and
reform in a survey health law class is tricky and will undoubtedly be imperfect.
One could spend a lifetime—and many, including myself, do—thinking about
the nuances of health insurance policy and regulation and the many values
imbedded in it. The challenge, as I see it, is how to impart the high points for
practicing health law and to cultivate erudite law graduates.
As this Article has described, my primary strategy is to zoom in on the
technical rules or legal reasoning and then pull back out to see the effect that
they have on people’s lives and livelihoods. This process reveals how technical
rules embody and reinforce social values. In conversation with Lindsay and
Whitney, I thought about how this strategy, which Lindsay nicely described as
the bungee-jump approach, forces students to pivot quickly between minutia
and the big picture. What struck me is that both of my students recognized this
telescoping in and out in class, and each experienced it differently. For
Whitney, this approach illuminated where macro questions and social values
are rooted in detailed statutes and doctrine. It helped her see policy and law as

61. Id.
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more fluid domains. For Lindsay, this bungee jump was novel and yet
somewhat jarring as we moved through the material in the class, but it
eventually enabled her to fit the many pieces we studied into a coherent whole,
which she did in part relying on the Gawande article she describes as a guide.
Seeing how two successful students responded differently was telling.
Fortunately, it affirmed that they were learning much of what I hoped they
would. It also revealed the moments where I could work to make some of my
intended messages come through more clearly, or with more ease, for my
students.
One insight was to make the course’s implicit themes more explicit. For
example, I realized that I never clearly elucidated the idea, described in the
Introduction to this Article, that I see insurance as both an expression of and
force that shapes social values. This idea motivates the way I approach this
material, and it could help students to understand my vantage on the journey
through it. I taught the course again as we drafted this Article, and I paused
early in the unit to unravel this idea while discussing the ACA policy that
someone buying health insurance on an exchange may be charged fifty percent
higher premiums if she uses tobacco products. 62 We examined how this
insurance regulation reflects social disapproval of tobacco use, a discussion
that was especially interesting with the participation of several international
LL.M. students, including a student from France whose difficulty wrapping her
mind around this rule illustrated its particular cultural valence.
As another example, in this last iteration of the course, I referred back to
the Gawande article to mark the idea of path dependence more explicitly, as
Lindsay was doing on her own. Expressly discussing the theme of path
dependence provided the opportunity to challenge Gawande’s thesis that path
dependence is inevitable, by asking students to imagine alternate universes that
the ACA might have created. This discussion, in turn, teases out questions that
Whitney was left to ponder on her own at the end of the course. Was Medicare
for all an option back in 2010? Would it have been better? Is our employerbased health insurance system a done deal or might its prominence lessen over
time? Even if its prominence remains, will and must it substantively remain
largely deregulated? If so, what is the cost of such deregulation? What might
be the next steps in health insurance reform and will they be future chapters in
a story of path dependence?
As part of this theme of path dependence, I also shared an idea that I have
written about elsewhere: the places where the ACA is most controversial,
resulting in public uproar and ligation, are the very places where it pushes most

62. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201, 124 Stat. 119,
154 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012)).
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strongly away from the preexisting system and its norms. 63 The individual
mandate faces resistance in part because it cuts against the notion of free
market private insurance and more strongly toward a solidaristic system of
health insurance. The ACA’s requirement that employer plans cover all
preventive care without cost sharing, including FDA-approved forms of
contraception, violates ERISA’s zone of deregulation for employer plans. 64
The ACA can thus be seen as simultaneously path dependent and path
changing. What is now fascinating is that the ACA has quickly become the
path on which the future of health insurance is dependent, a point that
Republicans in Congress and President Trump must contend with as they
contemplate making significant changes to the ACA.
Finally, and relatedly, my students’ insights suggested the need to spend
more time teaching the historical origins of the current system—from the
initiation and instantiation of the employer-based health care financing system
to Medicare and Medicaid to ERISA and the evolution of managed care. I
started teaching health law just prior to its modern transformation by the ACA
and have debated the right balance of pre- and post-ACA content.
Understanding the preexisting state of health care illuminates the very
problems that prompted the ACA. Each year, I add more nuance on the history
of health care delivery and financing and, especially, the evolution of managed
care. Some of the greatest puzzles in health law exist because of the quickly
changing picture of how we pay for health care in the United States, from
mostly out-of-pocket at the beginning of the twentieth century to a convoluted
insurance system by the end, to whatever will come next. Laws that made
sense (or at least caused little trouble) at one moment in time, such as ERISA
section 502 preemption rules at a time when insurers did not deny care
prospectively, can have untoward effects at a later moment. When teaching
about an area of regulation that is ever-changing, it can be easy to phase out
older material in favor of present controversies, but Whitney’s insights
reminded me that the former may be necessary to illuminate the latter.
I realize, as I weave in more history, that many of my own views on health
insurance regulation and reform and what is possible are informed by my
knowledge of this history and how health care financing and regulation has
changed over time (and could, impliedly, continue to change in the future).
This past semester, I devoted even more time to this historical arc to impart a
foundational knowledge in the same way that my health law and policy
professors, Ted Marmor and Jerry Mashaw, did for me a decade and a half ago.

63. Allison K. Hoffman, What Health Reform Reveals About Health Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman & William M. Sage
eds., 2017).
64. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014); Zubik v. Burwell,
136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560–61 (2016).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017] TEACHING AND LEARNING HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATION AND REFORM

435

What I remember from my own health law and policy class in law school is not
the details of Stark Law rules or antitrust doctrine (in fact, I’m fairly certain
my professors didn’t touch on this doctrine). What I remember is the two of
them prodding me and my classmates with questions like whether nonprofit
hospitals still deserve tax-exempt status in the modern era of health care big
business and what role and profit margins private insurance companies should
have in our health care financing system. They gave me insight into the
tremendous impact evolving legal rules and policies have on society as a
whole, and on individuals’ lives—a connection that now motivates my own
research and teaching.
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